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Abstract
We state and prove Kuhn’s equivalence theorem for a new representation of games,
the intrinsic form. First, we introduce games in intrinsic form where information
is represented by σ-fields over a product set. For this purpose, we adapt to games
the intrinsic representation that Witsenhausen introduced in control theory. Those
intrinsic games do not require an explicit description of the play temporality, as opposed
to extensive form games on trees. Second, we prove, for this new and more general
representation of games, that behavioral and mixed strategies are equivalent under
perfect recall (Kuhn’s theorem). As the intrinsic form replaces the tree structure with
a product structure, the handling of information is easier. This makes the intrinsic
form a new valuable tool for the analysis of games with information.
Keywords.Games with information, Kuhn’s equivalence theorem, Witsenhausen intrinsic
model.
1 Introduction
From the origin, games in extensive form have been formulated on a tree. In his seminal
paper Extensive Games and the Problem of Information [7], Kuhn claimed that “The use of
a geometrical model (. . . ) clarifies the delicate problem of information”. This tells us that
the proper handling of information was a strong motivation for Kuhn’s extensive games. On
the game tree, moves are those vertices that possess alternatives, then moves are partitioned
into players moves, themselves partitioned into information sets (with the constraint that
no two moves in an information set can be on the same play). Kuhn mentions agents, one
agent per information set, to “personalize the interpretation” but the notion is not central
(to the point that his definition of perfect recall “obviates the use of agents”).
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By contrast, in the so-called Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model [9, 10], agents play a central
role. Each agent is equipped with a decision set and a σ-field, and the same for Nature. Then,
Witsenhausen introduces the product set and the product σ-field. This product set hosts
the agents’ information subfields. The Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model was elaborated in the
control theory setting, in order to handle how information is distributed among agents and
how it impacts their strategies. Although not explicitly designed for games, Witsenhausen’s
intrinsic model had, from the start, the potential to be adapted to games. Indeed, in [9]
Witsenhausen places his own model in the context of game theory by referring to von Neuman
and Morgenstern [8], Kuhn [7] and Aumann [2].
In this paper, we introduce a new representation of games that we call games in intrinsic
form. Game representations play a key role in their analysis (see the illuminating introduc-
tion of the book [1]), and we claim that games in intrinsic form display appealing features.
In the philosophy of the tree-based extensive form (Kuhn’s view), the temporal ordering
is hardcoded in the tree structure: one goes from the root to the leaves, making decisions
at the moves, contingent on information, chance and strategies. For Kuhn, the time arrow
(tree) comes first; information comes second (partition of the move vertices). By contrast,
for Witsenhausen, information comes first; the time arrow comes (possibly) second, under a
proper causality assumption contingent to the information structure.
Not having a hardcoded temporal ordering makes mathematical representations less con-
strained, hence more general. Moreover, Witsenhausen’s framework makes representations
more intrinsic. As an illustration, let us consider a game where two players play once but at
the same time. To formulate it on a tree requires to arbitrarily decide which of the two plays
first. This is not the case for games in intrinsic form, where each player/agent is equipped
with an information subfield and strategies that are measurable with respect to the latter;
writing the system of two equations that express decisions as the output of strategies leads
to a unique outcome, without having to solve one equation first, and the other second.
The tree representation of games has its pros and cons. On the one hand, trees are perfect
to follow step by step how a game is played as any strategy profile induces a unique play: one
goes from the root to the leaves, passing from one node to the next by an edge that depends
on the strategy profile. On the other hand, in games with information, information sets are
represented as “union” of tree nodes that must satisfy restrictive axioms, and such unions
do not comply in a natural way with the tree structure, which can render the game analysis
delicate [1, 4, 5]. By contrast, the notion of Witsenhausen’s intrinsic games (W-games) does
not require an explicit description of the play temporality, and the intrinsic form replaces
the tree structure with a product structure, more amenable to mathematical analysis. If
the introduction of the model may seem involved, we argue that the resulting structure is a
powerful mathematical tool, because there are many situations in which it is easier to reason
and discuss with mathematical formulas than with trees.
We illustrate our claim with a proof of the celebrated Kuhn’s equivalence theorem for
games in intrinsic form. Indeed, as a first step in a broader research program, we show
that equivalence between mixed and behavioral strategies holds under perfect recall for W-
games. More precisely, our proof relies on an equivalence between behavioral, mixed and a
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new notion of product-mixed strategies. These latter form a subclass of mixed strategies.
In the spirit of [2], in a product-mixed strategy, each agent (corresponding to time index
in [2]) generates strategies from a random device that is independent of all the other agents.
We prove that, under perfect recall for W-games, any mixed strategy of a player is not only
equivalent to a behavioral strategy, but also to a product-mixed strategy where all the agents
under control of the player randomly select their pure strategy independently of the other
agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the finite version of Witsen-
hausen’s intrinsic model. Then, in Sect. 3, we propose a formal definition of games in intrinsic
form (W-games), and then discuss three notions of “randomization” of pure strategies —
mixed, product-mixed and behavioral. Finally, we derive an equivalent of Kuhn’s equiva-
lence theorem for games in intrinsic form in Sect. 4. In Appendix A, we present background
material on fields, atoms and partitions, as these notions lay at the core of Witsenhausen’s
intrinsic model in the finite case. In all the paper, we adopt the convention that a player is
female (hence using “she” and “her”), whereas an agent is male (“he”, “his”).
2 Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model (the finite case)
In this paper, we tackle the issue of information in the context of finite games. For this
purpose, we will present the so-called intrinsic model of Witsenhausen [10, 6] but with finite
sets rather than with infinite ones as in the original exposition. We refer the reader to
Appendix A for background material on fields, atoms and partitions.
In §2.1, we present the finite version of Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model, where we highlight
the role of the configuration field that contains the information subfields of all agents. In §2.2,
we illustrate, on a few examples, the ease with which one can model information in strategic
contexts, using subfields of the configuration field. Finally, we present in §2.3 the notions of
solvability and causality.
2.1 Finite Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model (W-model)
We present the finite version of Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model, introduced some five decades
ago in the control community [9, 10].
Definition 1. (adapted from [9, 10])
A finite W-model is a collection
(
A, (Ω,F), (Ua,Ua)a∈A , (Ia)a∈A
)
, where
• A is a finite set, whose elements are called agents;
• Ω is a finite set which represents all uncertainties; any ω ∈ Ω is called a state of
Nature; F is the complete field over Ω;
• for any a ∈ A, Ua is a finite set, the set of decisions for agent a; Ua is the complete
field over Ua;
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• for any a ∈ A, Ia is a subfield of the following product field
Ia ⊂ F ⊗
⊗
b∈A
Ub , ∀a ∈ A (1)
and is called the information field of the agent a.
The configuration space is the product space (called hybrid space by Witsenhausen, hence
the H notation)
H = Ω×
∏
a∈A
Ua . (2a)
As all fields F and (Ua)a∈A are complete, the product configuration field
H = F ⊗
⊗
a∈A
Ua (2b)
is also the complete field of H. A configuration h ∈ H is denoted by
h =
(
ω, (ua)a∈A
)
⇐⇒ h∅ = ω and ha = ua , ∀a ∈ A . (2c)
In lieu of the information field Ia in (1), it will be convenient to consider the equivalence
relation ∼a, on the configuration space H, defined in such a way that the equivalence classes
[·]a ⊂ H coincide with the atoms of Ia, that is, with the elements of the partition 〈Ia〉 in (33):(
∀h′, h′′ ∈ H
)
h′ ∼a h
′′ ⇔ h′′ ∈ [h′]a ⇔ ∃G ∈ 〈Ia〉 , {h
′, h′′} ⊂ G . (3)
Thus defined, the subset [h]a ⊂ H is the unique atom G in 〈Ia〉 ⊂ Ia that contains the
configuration h.
We will need the following equivalent characterization of measurable mappings, which is
a slight reformulation of [6, Proposition 3.35].
Proposition 2. (adapted from [6, Proposition 3.35]) Let ρ : (H,H)→ (D,D) be a mapping,
where D is a set and D is a σ-field over D. We suppose that the σ-field D contains all the
singletons. Then, for any agent a ∈ A, the following statements are equivalent:
ρ−1(D) ⊂ Ia , (4a)(
∀h′, h′′ ∈ H
)
h′ ∼a h
′′ =⇒ ρ(h′) = ρ(h′′) , (4b)
the set-valued mapping ρˆ : 〈Ia〉⇒ D , defined by
ρˆ(Ga) = {ρ(h) | h ∈ Ga} , ∀Ga ∈ 〈Ia〉 , is a mapping.
(4c)
In any of these equivalent cases, we say that the mapping ρ is Ia-measurable, and, for all
Ga ∈ 〈Ia〉, we denote by ρ(Ga) the unique element of D in ρˆ(Ga), that is,(
∀r ∈ ρ(H) , ∀Ga ∈ 〈Ia〉
)
ρ(Ga) = r ⇐⇒ ρˆ(Ga) = {r} . (5)
Then, using the extended notation above (3), we have the property
ρ is Ia-measurable =⇒ ρ([h]a) = ρ(h) , ∀h ∈ H . (6)
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Now that we have explicited measurable mappings with respect to agents information
subfields, we introduce the notion of pure W-strategy.
Definition 3. ([9, 10]) A pure W-strategy of agent a ∈ A is a mapping
λa : (H,H)→ (Ua,Ua) (7a)
from configurations to decisions, which is measurable with respect to the information field Ia
of agent a, that is,
λ−1a (Ua) ⊂ Ia . (7b)
We denote by Λa the set of all pure W-strategies of agent a ∈ A. A pure W-strategies
profile λ is a family
λ = (λa)a∈A ∈
∏
a∈A
Λa (8a)
of pure W-strategies, one per agent a ∈ A. The set of pure W-strategies profiles is
Λ =
∏
a∈A
Λa . (8b)
Condition (7b) expresses the property that any (pure) W-strategy of agent a may only
depend upon the information Ia available to the agent.
In what follows, we will need some notations. For any nonempty subset B ⊂ A of agents,
we define
UB =
⊗
b∈B
Ub ⊗
⊗
a6∈B
{∅,Ua} ⊂
⊗
a∈A
Ua , (9a)
HB = F ⊗ UB = F ⊗
⊗
b∈B
Ub ⊗
⊗
a6∈B
{∅,Ua} ⊂ H , (9b)
hB = (hb)b∈B ∈
∏
b∈B
Ub , ∀h ∈ H , (9c)
λB = (λb)b∈B ∈
∏
b∈B
Λb , ∀λ ∈ Λ . (9d)
2.2 Examples
We illustrate, on a few examples, the ease with which one can model information in strategic
contexts, using subfields of the configuration field. Even if we have presented the finite
version of Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model in §2.1, we take the opportunity here to show its
potential to describe infinite decision and Nature sets.
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Sequential decisions. Suppose an individual has to take decisions (say, an element of Rn)
at every discrete time step in the set1 J1, T−1K, where T ≥ 1 is an integer. The situation will
be modeled with (possibly) Nature set and field (Ω,F), and with T agents in A = J0, T−1K,
and their corresponding sets, Ut = R
n, and fields, Ut = BRn (the Borel σ-field of R
n),
for t ∈ A. Then, one builds up the product set H = Ω ×
∏T−1
t=0 Ut and the product field
H = F ⊗
⊗T−1
t=0 Ut. Every agent t ∈ J0, T−1K is equipped with an information field It ⊂ H.
Then, we show how we can express four information patterns: sequentiality, memory of
past information, memory of past actions, perfect recall. The inclusions It ⊂ H{0,...,t−1} =
F ⊗
⊗t−1
s=0Us ⊗
⊗T−1
s=t {∅,Us}, for t ∈ J0, T−1K, express that every agent can remember no
more than his past actions (sequentiality); memory of past information is represented by the
inclusions It−1 ⊂ It, for t ∈ J1, T−1K; memory of past actions is represented by the inclusions
{∅,Ω} ⊗
⊗t−1
s=0Us ⊗
⊗T−1
s=t {∅,Us} = {∅,Ω} ⊗ U{0,...,t−1} ⊂ It, for t ∈ J1, T−1K; perfect recall
is represented by the inclusions It−1 ∨
(
{∅,Ω} ⊗ U{0,...,t−1}
)
⊂ It, for t ∈ J1, T−1K.
To represent N players — each p of whom makes a sequence of decisions, one for each
period t ∈ J0, Tp−1K — we use
∏N
p=1 Tp agents, labelled by (p, t) ∈
⋃N
p′=1
(
{p′}×J0, Tp′−1K
)
.
With obvious notations, the inclusions I(p,t−1) ⊂ I(p,t) express memory of one’s own past infor-
mation, whereas the inclusions
∨N
p′=1
(
{∅,Ω} ⊗
⊗t−1
s=0Us ⊗
⊗Tp′−1
s=t {∅,Us}
)
⊂ I(p,t), express
memory of all players past actions.
Principal-Agent models. A branch of Economics studies so-called Principal-Agent mod-
els with two decision makers (agents) — the Principal Pr (leader) who makes decisions
uPr ∈ UPr, where the set UPr is equipped with a σ-field UPr, and the Agent Ag (follower)
who makes decisions uAg ∈ UAg, where the set UAg is equipped with a σ-field UAg — and with
Nature, corresponding to private information (or type) of the Agent Ag, taking values in a
set Ω, equipped with a σ-field F.
Hidden type (leading to adverse selection or to signaling) is represented by any informa-
tion structure with the property that, on the one hand,
IPr ⊂ {∅,Ω}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ag type not observed
⊗{∅,UPr} ⊗ UAg︸︷︷︸
Ag’s action possibly observed
, (10)
that is, the Principal Pr does not know the Agent Ag type, but can possibly observe the
Agent Ag action, and, on the other hand, that
F︸︷︷︸
known inner type
⊗{∅,UPr} ⊗ {∅,UAg} ⊂ IAg , (11)
that is, the Agent Ag knows the state of nature (his type).
Hidden action (leading to moral hazard) is represented by any information structure with
the property that, on the one hand,
IPr ⊂ F︸︷︷︸
possibly knows Ag type
⊗{∅,UPr} ⊗ {∅,UAg}︸ ︷︷ ︸
cannot observe Ag’s action
, (12)
1For any integers a ≤ b, Ja, bK denotes the subset {a, a+ 1, . . . , b− 1, b}.
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that is, the Principal Pr does not know the Agent Ag action, but can possibly observe the
Agent Ag type and, on the other hand, that the inclusion (11) holds true, that is, the agent Ag
knows the state of nature (his type).
Stackelberg leadership model. In Stackelberg games, the leader Pr makes a decision
uPr ∈ UPr — based at most upon the partial observation of the state ω ∈ Ω of Nature
— and the the follower Ag makes a decision uAg ∈ UAg — based at most upon the partial
observation of the state of Nature ω ∈ Ω, and upon the leader decision uPr ∈ UPr. This kind
of information structure is expressed with the following inclusions of fields:
IPr ⊂ F ⊗ {∅,UPr} ⊗ {∅,UAg} and IAg ⊂ F ⊗ UPr ⊗ {∅,UAg} . (13)
Even if the players are called leader and follower, there is no explicit time arrow in (13). It
is the information structure that reveals the time arrow. Indeed, if we label the leader Pr
as t = 0 (first player) and the follower Ag as t = 1 (second player), the inclusions (13) become
the inclusions I0 ⊂ F ⊗ {∅,U0} ⊗ {∅,U1}, and I1 ⊂ F ⊗ U0 ⊗ {∅,U1}: the sequence I0, I1 of
information fields is “adapted” to the filtration F ⊗ {∅,U0} ⊗ {∅,U1} ⊂ F ⊗ U0 ⊗ {∅,U1}.
But if we label the leader Pr as t = 1 and the follower Ag as t = 0, the new sequence
of information fields would not be “adapted” to the new filtration. It is the information
structure that prevents the follower to play first, but that makes possible the leader to play
first and the follower to play second.
2.3 Solvability and causality
In the Kuhn formulation, Witsenhausen says that “For any combination of policies one can
find the corresponding outcome by following the tree along selected branches, and this is an
explicit procedure” [9]. In the Witsenhausen formulation, there is no such explicit procedure
as, for any combination of policies, there may be none, one or many solutions to the closed-
loop equations; these equations express the decision of one agent as the output of his strategy,
supplied with Nature outcome and with all agents decisions. This is why Witsenhausen
needs a property of solvability, whereas Kuhn does not need it as it is hardcoded in the
tree structure. Then, Witsenhausen defines the notion of causality (which parallels that of
tree) and proves in [9] that solvability holds true under causality. Yet, in [9, Theorem 2],
Witsenhausen exhibits an example of noncausal W-model that is solvable.
2.3.1 Solvability
With any given pure W-strategies profile λ = (λa)a∈A ∈
∏
a∈A Λa we associate the set-valued
mapping
Mλ : Ω⇒
∏
b∈A
Ub (14)
ω 7→
{
(ub)b∈A ∈
∏
b∈A
Ub
∣∣∣ ua = λa(ω, (ub)b∈A) , ∀a ∈ A
}
.
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With this definition, we slightly reformulate below how Witsenhausen introduced the
property of solvability.
Definition 4. ([9, 10]) The solvability property holds true for the W-model of Definition 1
when, for any pure W-strategies profile λ = (λa)a∈A ∈
∏
a∈A Λa, the set-valued mapping Mλ
in (14) is a mapping whose domain is Ω, that is, the cardinal of Mλ(ω) is equal to one, for
any state of nature ω ∈ Ω.
Thus, under the solvability property, for any state of nature ω ∈ Ω, there exists one, and
only one, decision profile (ub)b∈A ∈
∏
b∈A Ub which is a solution of the closed-loop equations
ua = λa
(
ω, (ub)b∈A
)
, ∀a ∈ A . (15a)
In this case, we define the solution map
Mλ : Ω→
∏
b∈A
Ub (15b)
as the unique element contained in the image set Mλ(ω) that is, for all (ub)b∈A ∈
∏
b∈A Ub,
Mλ(ω) = (ub)b∈A ⇐⇒ Mλ(ω) = {(ub)b∈A}.
2.3.2 Configuration-orderings
In his articles [9, 10], Witsenhausen introduces a notion of causality that relies on suitable
configuration-orderings. Here, we introduce our own notations, because they make possible
a compact formulation of the causality property and, later, of perfect recall.
For any finite set D, let |D| denote the cardinal of D. Thus, |A| denotes the cardinal of
the set A, that is, |A| is the number of agents. For k ∈ J1, |A|K, let Σk denote the set of
k-orderings, that is, injective mappings from J1, kK to A:
Σk =
{
κ : J1, kK → A ; κ is an injection
}
. (16a)
The set Σ|A| is the set of total orderings of agents in A, that is, bijective mappings from
J1, |A|K to A (in contrast with partial orderings in Σk for k < |A|). For any k ∈ J1, |A|K, any
ordering κ ∈ Σk, and any integer ℓ ≤ k, κ|{1,...,ℓ} is the restriction of the ordering κ to the
first ℓ integers. For any k ∈ J1, |A|K, there is a natural mapping ψk
ψk : Σ
|A| → Σk , ρ 7→ ρ|{1,...,k} , (16b)
which is the restriction of any (total) ordering of A to J1, kK. We define the set of orderings
by
Σ =
⋃
k∈J0,|A|K
Σk where Σ0 = {∅} . (16c)
For any k ∈ J1, |A|K, and any k-ordering κ ∈ Σk, we define the range ‖κ‖ of the ordering κ
as the subset
‖κ‖ =
{
κ(1), . . . , κ(k)
}
⊂ A , ∀κ ∈ Σk , (16d)
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the cardinal |κ| of the ordering κ as the integer
|κ| = k ∈ J1, |A|K , ∀κ ∈ Σk , (16e)
the last element κ⋆ of the ordering κ as the agent
κ⋆ = κ(k) ∈ A , ∀κ ∈ Σk , (16f)
the restriction κ− of the ordering κ to the first k−1 elements
κ− = κ|{1,...,k−1} ∈ Σ
k−1 , ∀κ ∈ Σk . (16g)
With the notations introduced, any ordering κ ∈ Σ \ {∅} can be written as κ = (κ−, κ⋆),
with the convention that κ = (κ⋆) when κ ∈ Σ1.
Definition 5. ([9, 10]) A configuration-ordering is a mapping ϕ : H→ Σ|A| from configura-
tions towards total orderings. With any configuration-ordering ϕ, and any ordering κ ∈ Σ,
we associate the subset Hϕκ ⊂ H of configurations defined by
Hϕκ =
{
h ∈ H ; ψ|κ|
(
ϕ(h)
)
= κ
}
, ∀κ ∈ Σ . (17)
By convention, we put Hϕ∅ = H.
Along each configuration h ∈ H, the agents are ordered by ϕ(h) ∈ Σ|A|. The set Hϕκ
in (17) contains all the configurations for which the agent κ(1) is acting first, the agent κ(2)
is acting second, . . . , till the last agent κ⋆ = κ(|κ|) acting at stage |κ|.
2.3.3 Causality
In his article [9], Witsenhausen introduces a notion of causality and he proves that causal
systems are solvable.
The following definition can be interpreted as follows. In a causal W-model, there exists
a configuration-ordering with the following property: when an agent is called to play — as
he is the last one in an ordering — what he knows cannot depend on decisions made by
agents that are not his predecessors (in the range of the ordering under consideration).
Definition 6. ([9, 10]) A W-model (as in Definition 1) is causal if there exists (at least)
one configuration-ordering ϕ : H→ Σ|A| with the property that
Hϕκ ∩H ∈ H‖κ−‖ , ∀H ∈ Iκ⋆ , ∀κ ∈ Σ . (18)
Otherwise said, once we know the first |κ| agents, the information of the (last) agent κ⋆
depends at most on the decisions of the (previous) agents in the range ‖κ−‖. In (18), the
subset Hϕκ ⊂ H of configurations has been defined in (17), the last agent κ
⋆ in (16f), the
partial ordering κ− in (16g), the range ‖κ−‖ in (16d), and — using the definition (9b) of
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the subfield HB of H, with the subset B = ‖κ
−‖ of agents defined in (16g) and (16d) — the
subfield H‖κ−‖ of H is
H‖κ−‖ = F ⊗
⊗
a∈‖κ−‖
Ua ⊗
⊗
b6∈‖κ−‖
{∅,Ub} ⊂ H . (19)
Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model deals with agents, information and strategies, but not
with players and preferences. We now turn to extending the Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model
to games.
3 Finite games in intrinsic form
We are now ready to embed Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model into game theory. In §3.1, we
introduce a formal definition of a finite game in intrinsic form (W-game), and in §3.2 we
introduce three notions of “randomization” of pure strategies — mixed, product-mixed and
behavioral. In §3.3, we discuss relations between product-mixed and behavioral W-strategies.
In what follows, when D is a finite set, we denote by ∆(D) the set of probability dis-
tributions over D. When needed, the set ∆(D) can be equipped with the Borel topology
and the Borel σ-field, as ∆(D) is homeomorphic to the simplex Σ|D| of R
|D|, and is thus
homeomorphic to a closed subset of a finite dimensional space.
3.1 Definition of a finite game in intrinsic form (W-game)
We introduce a formal definition of a finite game in intrinsic form (W-game).
Definition 7. A finite W-game
((
(Ap)p∈P , (Ω,F), (Ua,Ua, Ia)a∈
⋃
p∈P A
p
)
, (-p)p∈P
)
, or a fi-
nite game in intrinsic form, is a made of
• a family (Ap)p∈P , where the set P of players is finite, of two by two disjoint nonempty
sets whose union A =
⋃
p∈P A
p is the set of agents; each subset Ap is interpreted as
the subset of executive agents of the player p ∈ P ,
• a finite W-model
(
A, (Ω,F), (Ua,Ua, Ia)a∈A
)
, as in Definition 1,
• for each player p ∈ P , a preference relation -p on the set of mappings Ω→ ∆(
∏
b∈A Ub).
A finite W-game is said to be solvable (resp. causal) if the underlying W-model is solvable
as in Definition 4 (resp. causal as in Definition 6).
We comment on the preference relations -p on the set of mappings Ω → ∆(
∏
b∈A Ub).
Our definition covers (like in [3]) the most traditional preference relation -p, which is the
numerical expected utility preference. In this latter, each player p ∈ P is endowed, on the
one hand, with a criterion (payoff), that is, a measurable function jp : (H,H)→ [−∞,+∞[,
and, on the other hand, with a belief, that is, a probability distribution νp : F → [0, 1] over
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the states of Nature (Ω,F). Then, given Ki : Ω → ∆(
∏
b∈A Ub), i = 1, 2, one says that
K1 -
p K2 if ∫
Ω
νp(dω)
∫
∏
b∈A Ub
jp
(
ω, (ub)b∈A
)
K1
(
ω, d (ub)b∈A
)
≤
∫
Ω
νp(dω)
∫
∏
b∈A Ub
jp
(
ω, (ub)b∈A
)
K2
(
ω, d (ub)b∈A
)
.
Note also that the Definition 7 includes Bayesian games, by specifying a product structure
for Ω — where some factors represent types of players, and one factor represents chance —
and by considering additional probability distributions.
3.2 Mixed, product-mixed and behavioral strategies
We introduce three notions of “randomization” of pure strategies: mixed, product-mixed
and behavioral.
The notion of mixed strategy comes from the study of games in normalized form, where
each player has to select a pure strategy, the collection of which determines a unique outcome.
If we allow the players to select their pure strategy at random, the lottery they use is called a
mixed strategy. For an extensive game, a mixed strategy can be interpreted in the following
sense. First, the player selects a pure strategy using the lottery. Second, the game is played.
When the player is called by the umpire, she plays the action specified by the selected pure
strategy for the current information set.
Observe that there is only one dice roll per player. This dice roll determines the reactions
of the player for every situation of the game. It would be more natural to let the player roll
a dice every time she has to play, leading to the notion of behavioral strategy.
A fundamental question in game theory is to identify settings in which those two views
(mixed strategy and behavioral strategy) are equivalent. To formulate this question in the
W-game framework, we will give formal definitions of these two notions of randomization.
We will also add a third one, that we call product-mixed strategy, and which is in the spirit
of Aumann [2], as each agent (corresponding to time index in [2]) “generates” strategies from
a random device that is independent of all the other agents.
3.2.1 Mixed W-strategies
For any agent a ∈ A, the set Λa of pure W-strategies for agent a (see Definition 3) is finite,
hence the set ∆(Λa) of probability distributions over Λa is is homeomorphic to Σ|Λa|, the
simplex of R|Λa|, and is thus homeomorphic to a closed subset of a finite dimensional space.
So is the space ∆(Λ) of probability distributions over the set Λ of pure W-strategies profiles.
We will also consider the sets
Λp =
∏
a∈Ap
Λa , ∀p ∈ P (20)
of pure W-strategies profiles, player by player, and the set ∆(Λp) of probability distributions
over Λp.
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Definition 8. We consider a finite W-game, as in Definition 7. A mixed W-strategy for
player p ∈ P is an element µp of ∆(Λp), the set of probability distributions over the set Λp
in (20) of W-strategies of the executive agents in Ap. The set of mixed W-strategies profiles
is
∏
p∈P ∆(Λ
p).
A mixed W-strategies profile is denoted by
µ = (µp)p∈P ∈
∏
p∈P
∆
(
Λp
)
, (21a)
and, when we focus on player p, we write
µ = (µp, µ−p) ∈ ∆
(
Λp
)
×
∏
p′ 6=p
∆
(
Λp
′)
. (21b)
Definition 9. We consider a solvable finite W-game (see Definition 7), and µ = (µp)p∈P ∈∏
p∈P ∆(Λ
p) a mixed W-strategies profile as in (21a). For any ω ∈ Ω, we denote by
Qωµ = Q
ω
(µp)p∈P
=
(⊗
p∈P
µp
)
◦
(
M(ω, ·)
)−1
∈ ∆
(∏
b∈A
Ub
)
(22a)
the pushforward probability, on the space
(∏
b∈A Ub,
⊗
b∈A
Ub
)
of the product probability distri-
bution
⊗
p∈P µ
p on
∏
p∈P Λ
p = Λ by the mapping
M(ω, ·) : Λ→
∏
b∈A
Ub , λ 7→Mλ(ω) , (22b)
where Mλ is the solution map (15b), which exists by the solvability assumption.
By (15a), which defines the solution map, and by definition of a pushforward probability,
we have, for any configuration
(
ω, (ub)b∈A
)
∈ H,
Qωµ
(
(ub)b∈A
)
=
(⊗
p∈P
µp
)(
M(ω, ·)−1
(
(ub)b∈A
))
=
∏
p∈P
µp
({
(λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p
∣∣∣λa(ω, (ub)b∈A) = ua , ∀a ∈ Ap
})
.
3.2.2 Product-mixed W-strategies
In a mixed W-strategy, the executive agents of player p ∈ P can be correlated because the
probability µp in Definition 8 is a joint probability on the product space Λp =
∏
a∈Ap Λa. We
now introduce product-mixed W-strategies, where the executive agents of player p ∈ P are
independent in the sense that the probability µp is the product of individual probabilities,
each of them on the individual space Λa of the strategies of one agent a.
Definition 10. We consider a finite W-game, as in Definition 7. A product-mixed W-
strategy for player p ∈ P is an element πp = (πpa)a∈Ap of
∏
a∈Ap ∆(Λa).
The product-mixed W-strategy (πpa)a∈Ap induces a product probability
2 ⊗a∈Apπ
p
a on the
2By an abuse of notation, we will sometimes write pip = ⊗a∈Appipa.
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set Λp, which is a mixed W-strategy as in Definition 8.
3.2.3 Behavioral W-strategies
We formalize the intuition of behavioral strategies in W-games by the following definition of
behavioral W-strategies.
Definition 11. We consider a finite W-game, as in Definition 7. A behavioral W-strategy
for player p ∈ P is a family βp = (βpa)a∈Ap, where
βpa : H× Ua → [0, 1] , (h, Ua) 7→ β
p
a(Ua | h) (23)
is an Ia-measurable stochastic kernel for each a ∈ A
p, that is, if one of the two equivalent
statements holds true:
1. on the one hand, the function h ∈ H 7→ βpa({ua} | h) is Ia-measurable, for any ua ∈ Ua
and, on the other hand, each βpa(· | h) is a probability distribution on the finite set Ua,
for any h ∈ H,
2. on the one hand, h′ ∼a h
′′ =⇒ βpa({ua} | h
′) = βpa({ua} | h
′′), for any ua ∈ Ua
and, on the other hand, for any h ∈ H, we have βpa({ua} | h) ≥ 0, ∀ua ∈ Ua, and∑
ua∈Ua
βpa({ua} | h) = 1.
The equivalences come from the fact that the sets H and Ua are finite and equipped with
their respective complete fields, and by Proposition 2, and especially (4b).
3.3 Relations between product-mixed and behavioral W-strategies
Here, we show that product-mixed and behavioral W-strategies are “equivalent” in the sense
that a product-mixed W-strategy naturally induces a behavioral W-strategy, and that a
behavioral W-strategy can be “realized” as a product-mixed W-strategy (see Figure 1).
From product-mixed to behavioral W-strategies
We prove that a product-mixed W-strategy naturally induces a behavioral W-strategy.
Proposition 12. We consider a finite W-game, as in Definition 7, and a player p ∈ P .
For any product-mixed W-strategy πp = (πpa)a∈Ap ∈
∏
a∈Ap ∆(Λa), as in Definition 10, we
define, for any agent a ∈ Ap,
πˆpa({ua} | h) = π
p
a
({
λa ∈ Λa ; λa(h) = ua
})
, ∀ua ∈ Ua , ∀h ∈ H . (24)
Then, πˆp = (πˆpa)a∈Ap is a behavioral W-strategy, as in Definition 11.
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Proof. Let be given a product-mixed W-strategy πp = (πpa)a∈Ap ∈
∏
a∈Ap ∆(Λa).
To prove that (24) defines a behavioral W-strategy, we have to show (see Item 1 in
Definition 11), on the one hand, that the function h ∈ H 7→ πˆpa({ua} | h) is Ia-measurable,
for any ua ∈ Ua and, on the other hand, that each β
p
a(· | h) is a probability on the finite
set Ua, for any h ∈ H. For this purpose, we will use the more practical characterization of
Item 2 in Definition 11.
Let us fix ua ∈ Ua. Let h
′, h′′ ∈ H be such that h′ ∼a h
′′, where we recall that the classes
of the equivalence relation ∼a in (3) are exactly the atoms in 〈Ia〉. By (6), we have that{
λa ∈ Λa ; λa(h
′) = ua
}
=
{
λa ∈ Λa ; λa(h
′′) = ua
}
. Therefore, from the expression (24), we
have obtained that h′ ∼a h
′′ =⇒ πˆpa({ua} | h
′) = πˆpa({ua} | h
′′), hence that the function
h ∈ H 7→ πˆpa({ua} | h) is Ia-measurable, by Proposition 2, and especially (4b).
By the expression (24), we have that πˆpa({ua} | h) ≥ 0, ∀ua ∈ Ua and, since π
p
a is a
probability on ∆(Λa), that
∑
ua∈Ua
πˆpa({ua} | h) = 1.
This ends the proof.
From behavioral to product-mixed W-strategies
We prove that a behavioral W-strategy can be “realized” as a product-mixed W-strategy.
Proposition 13. We consider a finite W-game, as in Definition 7, and a player p ∈ P .
For any behavioral W-strategy βp = (βpa)a∈Ap , as in Definition 11, there exists a product-
mixed W-strategy βˇp =
(
βˇpa
)
a∈Ap
, as in Definition 10, with the property that, for any agent a
in Ap we have
βˇpa
({
λa ∈ Λa ; λa(h) = ua
})
= βpa({ua} | h) , ∀ua ∈ Ua , ∀h ∈ H . (25)
Proof. We consider a fixed agent a ∈ Ap.
On the one hand, by Proposition 2, we get that
λa ∈ Λa ⇐⇒ ∃
(
uGaa
)
Ga∈〈Ia〉
∈ U〈Ia〉a , λa(h) = u
Ga
a , ∀Ga ∈ 〈Ia〉 , ∀h ∈ Ga ,
where U
〈Ia〉
a is the set of mappings from 〈Ia〉 to Ua. Therefore, the following mapping is a
bijection:
Ψ : Λa → U
〈Ia〉
a , λa 7→ (λa(Ga))Ga∈〈Ia〉 . (26a)
We denote the inverse bijection by
Φ = Ψ−1 : U〈Ia〉a → Λa . (26b)
On the other hand, by Item 1 in Definition 11, each βpa(· | h) is a probability on the finite
set Ua, for any h ∈ H. As the mapping h ∈ H 7→ β
p
a(· | h) is Ia-measurable, by Definition 11,
the notation βpa(· |Ga) makes sense by (5).
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We equip the finite set U
〈Ia〉
a with the product probability
⊗
Ga∈〈Ia〉
βpa(· |Ga), and we
define the pushforward probability
βˇpa =
( ⊗
Ga∈〈Ia〉
βpa(· |Ga)
)
◦ Φ−1 , (26c)
on the finite set Λa. Then, we calculate, for any h ∈ H,
βˇpa
({
λa ∈ Λa ; λa(h) = ua
})
=
( ⊗
Ga∈〈Ia〉
βpa(· |Ga)
)(
Φ−1
({
λa ∈ Λa ; λa(h) = ua
}))
(by definition (26c))
=
( ⊗
Ga∈〈Ia〉
βpa(· |Ga)
)(
Ψ
({
λa ∈ Λa ; λa(h) = ua
}))
(as Φ−1 = Ψ by (26b))
=
( ⊗
Ga∈〈Ia〉
βpa(· |Ga)
)(
{ua} × U
〈Ia〉\[h]a
a
)
because, by definition of the mapping Ψ in (26a), any λa ∈
{
λ′a ∈ Λa ; λ
′
a(h) = ua
}
takes the
value ua on the atom [h]a (by definition of the set Λa in Definition 3 and by (6)), and any
possible value in Ua for all the other atoms in 〈Ia〉 \ [h]a
= βpa({ua} | [h]a)×
∏
Ga∈〈Ia〉\[h]a
βpa(Ua |Ga)
(by definition of the product probability
⊗
Ga∈〈Ia〉
βpa(· |Ga))
= βpa({ua} | [h]a)×
∏
Ga∈〈Ia〉\[h]a
1 (as βpa(Ua |Ga) = 1 for all Ga ∈ 〈Ia〉)
= βpa({ua} | [h]a)
= βpa({ua} | h)
as the function h ∈ H 7→ βpa({ua} | h) is Ia-measurable, by Item 1 in Definition 11, and
using (6).
This ends the proof.
4 Kuhn’s equivalence theorem
Now, we are equipped to give, for games in intrinsic form, a statement and a proof of the
celebrated Kuhn’s equivalence theorem: when a player enjoys perfect recall, for any mixed
W-strategy, there is an equivalent behavioral strategy.
In this Section, we consider a causal finite W-game (see Definition 7), that is, the under-
lying W-model (as in Definition 1) is causal (see Definition 6), with suitable configuration-
ordering ϕ : H→ Σ|A|. In §4.1, we introduce a formal definition of perfect recall in a causal
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mixed
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W-strategies
Proposition 15 under perfect recall
injection
Proposition 12
Proposition 13
Figure 1: Three Propositions that relate three notions of randomization of strategies
finite game in intrinsic form. In §4.2 (Proposition 15), we show that any mixed W-strategy
induces a behavioral W-strategy under perfect recall (see Figure 1). Finally, in §4.3 (The-
orem 16), we give a statement and a proof of Kuhn’s equivalence theorem for games in
intrinsic form.
4.1 Definition of perfect recall for causal W-games
For any agent a ∈ A, we define the choice field Ca ⊂ H by
Ca = Ua
∨
Ia , ∀a ∈ A . (27)
Thus defined, the choice field of an agent contains both what the agent did and what he
knew when making the decision.
The following definition of perfect recall is new.
Definition 14. We consider a causal finite W-game for which the underlying W-model is
causal with the configuration-ordering ϕ : H→ Σ|A|.
We say that a player p ∈ P enjoys perfect recall if, for any ordering κ ∈ Σ such
that κ⋆ ∈ Ap (that is, the last agent is an executive of the player), we have
Hϕκ ∩H ∈ Iκ⋆ , ∀H ∈ C‖κ−‖∩Ap , (28a)
where the subset Hϕκ ⊂ H of configurations has been defined in (17), the last agent κ
⋆ in (16f),
the partial ordering κ− in (16g), the range ‖κ−‖ in (16d), and where
C‖κ−‖∩Ap =
∨
a∈‖κ−‖
a∈Ap
Ca , (28b)
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with the choice subfield Ca ⊂ H given by (27).
We interpret the above definition as follows. A player enjoys perfect recall when any of
her executive agents — when called to play as the last one in an ordering — knows at least
what did and knew those of the executive agents that are both his predecessors (in the range
of the ordering under consideration) and that are executive agents of the player.
4.2 Mixed W-strategy induces behavioral W-strategy under per-
fect recall
As a preparatory result for the proof of Kuhn’s equivalence theorem, we show that any mixed
W-strategy induces a behavioral W-strategy under perfect recall.
Proposition 15. We consider a causal finite W-game (see Definition 7), for which the
underlying W-model (see Definition 1) is causal (see Definition 6) with the configuration-
ordering ϕ : H→ Σ|A|.
We consider a player p ∈ P , equipped with a mixed W-strategy µp ∈ ∆(Λp) and supposed
to enjoy perfect recall (see Definition 14), and an agent a ∈ Ap.
Then, for each agent a ∈ Ap, the following formula3
µ˜pa({ua} | h) =
µp
{
λ ∈ Λp ; ∃κ ∈ Σ, h ∈ Hϕκ , κ
⋆ = a, λa(h) = ua, λ‖κ−‖∩Ap(h) = h‖κ−‖∩Ap
}
µp
{
λ ∈ Λp ; ∃κ ∈ Σ, h ∈ Hϕκ , κ⋆ = a, λ‖κ−‖∩Ap(h) = h‖κ−‖∩Ap
} (29)
defines an Ia-measurable stochastic kernel µ˜
p
a. As a consequence, the family µ˜
p = (µ˜pa)a∈Ap ,
is a behavioral W-strategy, as in Definition 11.
Proof. We consider a player p ∈ P , equipped with a mixed W-strategy µp ∈ ∆(Λp) and
supposed to enjoy perfect recall as in Definition 14, and an agent a ∈ Ap.
By (29), it is easy to see that, for any h ∈ H, we have µ˜pa({ua} | h) ≥ 0, ∀ua ∈ Ua, and∑
ua∈Ua
µ˜pa({ua} | h) = 1. Therefore, by Item 1 in Definition 11, there remains to prove that
the function h ∈ H 7→ µ˜pa({ua} | h) is Ia-measurable. The proof is in several steps.
• As the agent a ∈ A is fixed, it is easily seen that the family (Hϕκ)κ∈Σ, κ⋆=a, where the
subset Hϕκ ⊂ H of configurations has been defined in (17), is made of (possibly empty)
disjoint sets whose union is H. Indeed, on the one hand, for any h ∈ H, we have that
h ∈ Hϕκ0 where κ0 = ψk(ρ), with ρ = ϕ(h) and k the unique integer such that ρ(k) = a. On
the other hand, if we had Hϕκ1 ∩ H
ϕ
κ2
6= ∅, with κ1
⋆ = κ2
⋆ = a, then h ∈ Hϕκ1 ∩ H
ϕ
κ2
would
be such that κ1 = κ2 = ψk(ρ), with ρ = ϕ(h) and k the unique integer such that ρ(k) = a.
Thus, κ1 6= κ2 =⇒ H
ϕ
κ1
∩Hϕκ2 = ∅.
3With the convention that µ˜p
a
({ua} | h) = 0 if the denominator is zero (in which case the numerator,
which is smaller, is also zero), and using the notations λ = (λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p, (9c) for hB and (9d) for λB, with
B = ‖κ−‖ ∩ Ap, where the last agent κ⋆ has been defined in (16f), the partial ordering κ− in (16g) and the
range ‖κ−‖ in (16d).
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• As the family (Hϕκ)κ∈Σ, κ⋆=a is made of disjoint sets whose union is H, we rewrite (29) as
µ˜pa({ua} | h)
=
∑
κ∈Σ
κ⋆=a
µp
{
λ ∈ Λp ; h ∈ Hϕκ , λa(h) = ua , λ‖κ−‖∩Ap(h) = h‖κ−‖∩Ap
}
∑
κ∈Σ,κ⋆=a
µp
{
λ ∈ Λp ; h ∈ Hϕκ , λ‖κ−‖∩Ap(h) = h‖κ−‖∩Ap
}
=
∑
κ∈Σ,κ⋆=a µ
p
{
Φκ(h, ua)
}
∑
κ∈Σ,κ⋆=a
∑
ua∈Ua
µp
{
Φκ(h, ua)
} ,
where, for any h ∈ H, ua ∈ Ua and κ ∈ Σ such that κ
⋆ = a, we have defined the following
subset of strategies
Φκ(h, ua) = (30a){
λ ∈ Λp ; h ∈ Hϕκ , λa(h) = ua , λ‖κ−‖∩Ap(h) = h‖κ−‖∩Ap
}
⊂ Λp .
We will prove, in three steps, that Φκ(h, ua) in (30a) takes the same (set) value for any
h ∈ Ga, where Ga is an atom of Ia.
• Let Ga ⊂ H be an atom of Ia. We prove that there exists a unique κ0 ∈ Σ such that
κ0
⋆ = a and Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ0
, that is, we prove that
Ga ∈ 〈Ia〉 =⇒ ∃! κ0 ∈ Σ , κ0
⋆ = a , Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ0
. (30b)
First, we show that, for any κ ∈ Σ such that κ⋆ = a, we have either Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ or
Ga ∩H
ϕ
κ = ∅. Indeed, by (28a) with H = H ∈ C‖κ−‖∩Ap, we obtain that H
ϕ
κ ∈ Ia. Therefore,
either Ga ∩ H
ϕ
κ = ∅ or Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ by (34) since Ga is an atom of Ia. Second, we have seen
that the family (Hϕκ)κ∈Σ, κ⋆=a is made of disjoint sets whose union is H.
By combining both results, we conclude that there exists a unique κ0 ∈ Σ such that
κ0
⋆ = a and Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ0
.
• As a consequence of (30b), we have that Φκ(h, ua) = ∅, for any h ∈ Ga, and for any κ ∈ Σ
such that κ 6= κ0 and κ
⋆ = a. There only remains to prove that Φκ0(h, ua) in (30a) takes the
same (set) value for any h ∈ Ga. For this purpose, we consider h
′, h′′ ∈ H which belong to
the atom Ga ∈ 〈Ia〉, that is, {h
′, h′′} ⊂ Ga, and we establish two preliminary results.
First, we prove that h′‖κ0−‖∩Ap = h
′′
‖κ0−‖∩Ap
. For this purpose, we define the subset
H ′ =
{
h ∈ H ; h‖κ0−‖∩Ap = h
′
‖κ0−‖∩Ap
}
⊂ H and we show in two steps that h′′ ∈ H ′, hence
that h′‖κ0−‖∩Ap = h
′′
‖κ0−‖∩Ap
, that is, we show that
{h′, h′′} ⊂ Ga =⇒ h
′
‖κ0−‖∩Ap
= h′′‖κ0−‖∩Ap . (30c)
- We show that Hϕκ0∩H
′ ∈ Ia. By definition of the field U‖κ0−‖∩Ap in (9a) with B = ‖κ
−‖∩Ap,
and because each field Ub, for b ∈ ‖κ0
−‖∩Ap, is complete, hence has the singletons for
atoms, we have that H ′ ∈ U‖κ0−‖∩Ap . As U‖κ0−‖∩Ap ⊂ C‖κ0−‖∩Ap by (28b), we use the
perfect recall assumption (28a) with H = H ′, and obtain that Hϕκ0 ∩ H
′ ∈ Iκ0⋆ = Ia
since κ0
⋆ = a.
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- As Hϕκ0∩H
′ ∈ Ia and Ga is an atom of Ia, we have either Ga∩H
ϕ
κ0
∩H ′ = ∅ or Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ0
∩H ′
by (34). Now, as h′ ∈ H ′ and h′ ∈ Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ0
, we get that Ga ∩ H
ϕ
κ0
∩ H ′ 6= ∅, and
therefore Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ0
∩ H ′. Since h′′ ∈ Ga, we deduce that h
′′ ∈ H ′, hence that
h′‖κ0−‖∩Ap = h
′′
‖κ0−‖∩Ap
.
Second, we prove that, for any b ∈ ‖κ0
−‖ ∩ Ap and any atom Gb of Ib, we have either
{h′, h′′} ∩Gb = ∅ or {h
′, h′′} ⊂ Gb, that is, we prove that(
b ∈ ‖κ0
−‖ ∩ Ap and Gb ∈ 〈Ib〉
)
=⇒(
{h′, h′′} ∩Gb = ∅ or {h
′, h′′} ⊂ Gb
)
.
(30d)
For this purpose, we consider b ∈ ‖κ0
−‖ ∩ Ap and Gb ∈ 〈Ib〉.
As Ib ⊂ C‖κ0−‖∩Ap by (28b), we use the perfect recall assumption (28a) with H = Gb, and
obtain that Hϕκ0 ∩Gb ∈ Iκ0⋆ = Ia since κ0
⋆ = a by (30b). As a consequence, as Hϕκ0 ∩Gb ∈ Ia
and Ga is an atom of Ia, we have either Ga ∩ H
ϕ
κ0
∩ Gb = ∅ or Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ0
∩ Gb by (34).
Since {h′, h′′} ⊂ Ga by assumption, where Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ0
by (30b), we conclude that either
{h′, h′′} ⊂ Gb or {h
′, h′′} ∩Gb = ∅.
• We consider an atom Ga ∈ 〈Ia〉, and we finally prove that Φκ0(h, ua) in (30a) takes the
same (set) value for any h ∈ Ga. For this purpose, we consider h
′ and h′′ which belong to the
atom Ga of Ia, that is, {h
′, h′′} ⊂ Ga, and we show that λ ∈ Φκ0(h
′, ua) =⇒ λ ∈ Φκ0(h
′′, ua).
Thus, we take λ ∈ Φκ0(h
′, ua) in (30a) — that is, λ ∈ Λ
p is such that h′ ∈ Hϕκ0 , λa(h
′) = ua
and λ‖κ0−‖∩Ap(h
′) = h′‖κ0−‖∩Ap — and we are going to prove in three steps that h
′′ ∈ Hϕκ0 ,
λa(h
′′) = ua and λ‖κ0−‖∩Ap(h
′′) = h′′‖κ0−‖∩Ap .
- First, we have that h′′ ∈ Hϕκ0 since {h
′, h′′} ⊂ Ga by assumption, and Ga ⊂ H
ϕ
κ0
by (30b).
- Second, since {h′, h′′} ⊂ Ga by assumption and since the strategy λa is Ia-measurable, we
have that λa(h
′) = λa(h
′′) by (4b), hence λa(h
′′) = ua since λa(h
′) = ua by assumption.
- Third, we have shown that, for any b ∈ ‖κ0
−‖ ∩Ap and any atom Gb of Ib, we have either
{h′, h′′} ⊂ Gb or {h
′, h′′} ∩ Gb = ∅ by (30d). As a consequence, the pair {h
′, h′′} is
included in one of the atoms that make the partition 〈Ib〉. Therefore, we obtain that
λb(h
′) = λb(h
′′) by (4b), hence λ‖κ0−‖∩Ap(h
′) = λ‖κ0−‖∩Ap(h
′′), using the notation (9d)
for λB, with B = ‖κ
−‖ ∩ Ap. As we had obtained in (30c) that h′‖κ0−‖∩Ap = h
′′
‖κ0−‖∩Ap
,
we conclude that λ‖κ0−‖∩Ap(h
′′) = λ‖κ0−‖∩Ap(h
′) = h′‖κ0−‖∩Ap = h
′′
‖κ0−‖∩Ap
.
As a consequence, we have just proved that λ ∈ Φκ0(h
′′, ua), hence that Φκ0(h
′, ua) =
Φκ0(h
′′, ua) whenever {h
′, h′′} ⊂ Ga.
• Let Ga be an atom of Ia. Finally, since Φκ(h, ua) in (30a) takes the same (set) value for
any h ∈ Ga, the expression (29) takes the same value for any h ∈ Ga, and thus the function
h ∈ H 7→ µ˜pa({ua} | h) is Ia-measurable.
This ends the proof.
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4.3 Kuhn’s equivalence theorem for causal finite games in intrinsic
form
Finally, we give a statement and a proof of Kuhn’s equivalence theorem for games in intrinsic
form.
Theorem 16. We consider a causal finite W-game (see Definition 7), and a player p ∈ P
supposed to enjoy perfect recall (see Definition 14).
Then, for any mixed W-strategy µp ∈ ∆(Λp), there exists a product-mixed W-strategy
πp = (πpa)a∈Ap ∈
∏
a∈Ap ∆(Λa), as in Definition 10, such that
4
Qω(µp,µ−p) = Q
ω
(πp,µ−p) , ∀µ
−p ∈
∏
p′ 6=p
∆
(
Λp
′)
, ∀ω ∈ Ω , (31)
where the probability distribution Qωµ ∈ ∆
(∏
b∈A Ub
)
has been defined in (22).
Proof. The proof is in three steps.
• First, as all the assumptions of Proposition 15 are satisfied, there exists a behavioral W-
strategy µ˜p = (µ˜pa)a∈Ap , as in Definition 11, which satisfies (29). By Proposition 13, we
define the product-mixed W-strategy πp = ˇ˜µp, that is, with the property (25) that, for any
agent a ∈ Ap,
πpa
{
λa ∈ Λa ; λa(h) = ua
}
= µ˜pa({ua} | h) , ∀ua ∈ Ua , ∀h ∈ H . (32a)
• Second, we prove that5
µp
{
(λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p ; λa(h) = ha , ∀a ∈ A
p
}
= πp
{
(λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p ; λa(h) = ha , ∀a ∈ A
p
}
, ∀h ∈ H . (32b)
In what follows, we consider a configuration h ∈ H and the total ordering ρ = ϕ(h) ∈ Σ|A|.
We label the set Ap of agents of the player p by the stage at which each of them plays as
follows:
Ap = {ρ(j1), . . . , ρ(jN )} with j1 < · · · < jN . (32c)
4See Footnote 2 for the abuse of notation pip = ⊗a∈Appipa.
5See Footnote 2 for the abuse of notation pip = ⊗a∈Appipa.
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With this, we have6
µp
{
(λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p ; λa(h) = ha , ∀a ∈ A
p
}
= µp
{(
λρ(jk)
)
k∈JNK
∈
N∏
k=1
Λρ(jk) ; λρ(jk)(h) = hρ(jk) , ∀k ∈ JNK
}
(as Ap = {ρ(j1), . . . , ρ(jN)} by (32c))
=
N∏
n=1
µp
{(
λρ(jk)
)
k∈JnK
∈
n∏
k=1
Λρ(jk) ; λρ(jk)(h) = hρ(jk) , ∀k ∈ JnK
}
µp
{(
λρ(jk)
)
k∈Jn−1K
∈
n−1∏
k=1
Λρ(jk) ; λρ(jk)(h) = hρ(jk) , ∀k ∈ Jn− 1K
}
where, if the smaller term (the one to be found two equality lines above) is zero, every
fraction is supposed to take the value zero, and, if the smaller term is positive, so are all the
terms and no denominator is zero
=
N∏
n=1
µ˜
p
ρ(jn)
({hρ(jn)} | h)
by (29), because ‖ψjn(ρ)‖ ∩ A
p = {ρ(jn)} ∪
(
‖ψjn−1(ρ)‖ ∩ A
p
)
by definition (16b) of the
restriction mapping ψ, and by definition of the sequence j1 < · · · < jN in (32c), which is
such that Ap = {ρ(j1), . . . , ρ(jN)}
=
N∏
n=1
π
p
ρ(jn)
{
λρ(jn) ∈ Λρ(jn) ; λρ(jn)(h) = hρ(jn)
}
(by (32a))
=
( N⊗
n=1
π
p
ρ(jn)
){(
λρ(jk)
)
k∈JNK
∈
N∏
k=1
Λρ(jk) ; λρ(jk)(h) = hρ(jk) , ∀k ∈ JNK
}
(by definition of the product probability)
=
( N⊗
n=1
π
p
ρ(jn)
){
(λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p ; λa(h) = ha
}
(as Ap = {ρ(j1), . . . , ρ(jN)} in (32c))
Thus, we have proved (32b).
• Third, for any configuration h =
(
ω, (ub)b∈A
)
∈ H, we have
6Using the notation JnK = {1, . . . , n} to shorten some expressions.
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Qωµ
(
(ub)b∈A
)
=
(⊗
p∈P
µp
)(
M(ω, ·)−1
(
(ub)b∈A
))
(by definition (22a) of Qωµ)
=
(⊗
p∈P
µp
){
λ ∈ Λ ; M(ω, λ) = (ub)b∈A
}
(by definition of a pushforward probability)
=
(⊗
p∈P
µp
){
λ ∈ Λ ; λa
(
ω, (ub)b∈A
)
= ua , ∀a ∈ A
}
(by (22b) and (15a) which define the mapping M(ω, ·))
=
∏
p∈P
µp
{
(λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p ; λa
(
ω, (ub)b∈A
)
= ua , ∀a ∈ A
p
}
by definition of the product probability
⊗
p∈P µ
p on the product space
∏
p∈P Λ
p
=
∏
p∈P
µp
{
(λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p ; λa(h) = ha , ∀a ∈ A
p
}
(because h =
(
ω, (ub)b∈A
)
and where we have used notation (2c))
=
∏
p′ 6=p
µp
′{
(λa)a∈Ap′ ∈ Λ
p′ ; λa(h) = ha , ∀a ∈ A
p′
}
× µp
{
(λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p ; λa(h) = ha , ∀a ∈ A
p
}
(where we have singled out the player p)
=
∏
p′ 6=p
µp
′{
(λa)a∈Ap′ ∈ Λ
p′ ; λa(h) = ha , ∀a ∈ A
p′
}
× πp
{
(λa)a∈Ap ∈ Λ
p ; λa(h) = ha , ∀a ∈ A
p
}
(by (32b))
= Qω(πp,µ−p)
(
(ub)b∈A
)
,
by reverting to the top equality with µp replaced by πp.
This ends the proof.
5 Discussion
Most games in extensive form are formulated on a tree. However, whereas trees are perfect to
follow step by step how a game is played, they can be delicate to manipulate when information
sets are added and must satisfy restrictive axioms to comply with the tree structure [1, 4, 5].
In this paper, we have introduced the notion of games in intrinsic form, where the tree
structure is replaced with a product structure, more amenable to mathematical analysis.
For this, we have adapted Witsenhausen’s intrinsic model — a model with Nature, agents
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and their decision sets, and where information is represented by σ-fields — to games. In
contrast to games in extensive form formulated on a tree, Witsenhausen’s intrinsic games
(W-games) do not require an explicit description of the play temporality. Not having a
hardcoded temporal ordering makes mathematical representations more intrinsic.
As part of a larger research program, we have focused here on Kuhn’s equivalence theo-
rem. For this purpose, we have defined the property of perfect recall for a player of a causal
W-game (that is, without referring to a tree structure), and we have introduced three differ-
ent definitions of “randomized” strategies in the W-games setting — mixed, product-mixed
and behavioral. Then, we have shown that, under perfect recall for a player, any of her
possible mixed strategies can be replaced by a behavioral strategy, which is the statement
of Kuhn’s equivalence theorem. Moreover, we have shown that any of her possible mixed
strategies can also be replaced by a product-mixed strategy, that is, a mixed strategy under
which her executive agents are probabilistically independent.
We add to the existing literature on extensive games representation by proposing a repre-
sentation that is more general than the tree-based ones as, for instance, it allows to describe
noncausal situations. Indeed, Witsenhausen showed that there are noncausal W-models that
yet are solvable.
Furthermore, our paper illustrates that the intrinsic form is well equipped to handle
proofs with mathematical formulas, without resorting to tree-based arguments that can be
cumbersome when handling information. We hence believe that the intrinsic form constitutes
a new valuable tool for the analysis of games with information.
The current work is the first output of a larger research program that addresses games in
intrinsic form. We are currently working on the embedding of tree-based games in extensive
form into W-games (by a mapping that associates each information set with an agent),
and on the restricted class of W-games that can be embedded in tree-based games. Futher
research includes extensions to measurable decision sets, and to infinite number of agents
or players. We will also investigate what can be said about subgame perfect equilibria and
backward induction, as well as Bayesian games.
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A Background on fields, atoms and partitions
In this paper, we present the intrinsic model of Witsenhausen [10, 6] but with finite sets
rather than with infinite ones as in the original exposition. Witsenhausen used the language
of σ-fields7 to handle the concept of information in control theory. Because sets are finite,
we consider a restricted subclass of σ-fields. In what follows, D is a finite set.
7Recall that a σ-field over the set D is a subset D ⊂ 2D, containing D, and which is stable under
complementation and countable union.
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An algebra, or a field, over the finite set D is a subset D ⊂ 2D, containing D, and which
is stable under complementation and union. The trivial field over the finite set D is the field
{∅,D}. The complete field over the finite set D is the field 2D.
An atom of the field D (over the finite set D) is a minimal element for the inclusion ⊂,
that is, an atom is a nonempty subset D ∈ D such that K ∈ D and K ⊂ D imply that
K = ∅ or K = D. We denote by 〈D〉 the set of atoms of the field D:
〈D〉 =
{
D ∈ D\{∅} ;
(
K ∈ D and K ⊂ D
)
⇒
(
K = ∅ or K = D
)}
. (33)
For instance, a complete field has the singletons for atoms. It can be shown that the atoms
of D form a partition of D, that is, they consist of mutually disjoint nonempty subsets whose
union is D [6, Proposition 3.18]. As a consequence, any element of the field D is necessarily
written as the union of atoms that it contains, and we have the useful property(
K ∈ D and D ∈ 〈D〉
)
⇒
(
K ∩D = ∅ or K ⊂ D
)
. (34)
Consider two fields D and D′ over the finite set D. We say that the field D is finer than
the field D′ if D ⊃ D′ (notice the reverse inclusion). We also say that D′ is a subfield of D.
As an illustration, the complete field is finer than any field or, equivalently, any field is a
subfield of the complete field.
The least upper bound of two fields D and D′, denoted by D ∨D′, is the smallest field
that contains D and D′. The atoms of D ∨D′ are all the nonempty intersections between
an atom of D and an atom of D′. The least upper bound of two fields is finer than any of
the two.
Consider a field D over the finite set D, and a field D′ over the finite set D′. The product
field D ⊗ D′ is the smallest field, over the finite product set D × D′, that contains all the
rectangles, that is, that contains all the products of an element of D with an element of D′.
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